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Case Comments
Barnes v. Kline: Picking the President's Pocket?
INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 1983, the Ninety-eighth Congress presented H.R. 40421 to President Reagan for consideration 2 and
adjourned its first session,3 agreeing to commence its second
session nine weeks later.4 The President did not sign H.R. 4042
or return it to Congress with a veto message. 5 Ordinarily, such6
presidential inaction results in a bill becoming law by default.
H.R. 4042, however, was not published as law in the belief that
the President's inaction resulted in a pocket veto pursuant to
article I, section 7, clause 2 of the Constitution.7 This provision
1. H.R. 4042, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1983). The disputed bill renewed the human rights certification requirements of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981,
22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1982). These requirements conditioned continued military
aid to El Salvador on presidential certification of human rights protection in
that country. I& The nature of this bill underscores both the relevance and
the importance of the pocket veto issue. For an historical summary of several
significant pocket-vetoed bills not discussed in this Comment, see C. JACKSON,
PRESIDENTIAL VErOES 1792-1945, at 8-9, 45-46, 108-10, 200-01 (1967).
2. 129 CONG. REc. H10,663 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1983).
3. 129 CONG. REC. H10,469, S16,779 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983).
4. Congress agreed to begin its second session on January 23, 1984.
H.R.J. Res. 421, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H10,105 (daily ed. Nov.
17, 1983); id. at S16,858 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983). By standing rule of the House
of Representatives, the Clerk of the House was authorized to receive presidential messages whenever the House was not in session. See MANUAL AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule I, cl. 5, reprnted in H.R.
DOC. No. 271, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1983), reprinted in U.S. CONG. SERIAL
SET No. 13,479, at 318 (1984). The Senate conferred the temporary authority
to receive such messages on the Secretary of the Senate. 129 CONG. REC.
S17,192-93 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983).
5. On November 30, 1984, the Executive Office issued a statement announcing that President Reagan would withhold his approval of H.R. 4042. 19
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. DOC. 1627 (Nov. 30, 1983). For further discussion of this
statement, see infra note 126.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. For the text of art. I, § 7, cl. 2, see infra
note 7.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The pocket veto clause is the last portion
of the final sentence of art. I, § 7, cl. 2 of the Constitution, which describes the
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states that if the President does not sign a bill or veto and return it within ten days after presentment, it automatically becomes law "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent
's
its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law."
Thirty-three members of the House of Representatives
brought suit, arguing that H.R. 4042 became law ten days after
presentment and that the President's inaction was not a valid
pocket veto.9 The District Court for the District of Columbia
respective roles of the President and Congress in the legislative process. Art.
I, § 7, cl. 2 reads:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall
have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration twothirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law ....If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Id. (emphasis added) (To ease reading, this provision will hereinafter be referred to as "article I, section 7" in the text and "art. I, § 7, cl. 2" in the footnotes.).
Under this provision, a bill has only four possible paths after presentment
to the President: 1) the President may sign the bill and it becomes law, 2) the
President may, within 10 days, exercise his qualified veto to disapprove the bill
and to return it to the house of Congress where it originated, whereupon Congress may attempt to override the veto; 3) the President may take no action,
whereupon the bill becomes law without his signature after 10 days (excepting
Sundays); or 4) the President may take no action, but Congress by its adjournment may prevent him from returning it, resulting in a "pocket veto." If
pocket-vetoed, a bill expires and Congress has no opportunity to override the
veto. Id.
8. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
9. See Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163, 165-66 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom.
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). The House
members sought declaratory and injunctive relief to nullify the attempted
pocket veto and to compel the publication of H.R. 4042 as a public law. The
defendants were those responsible for the delivery and the publication of approved legislation, the Executive Clerk of the White House and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. Id. at 164. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration, Ray Kline, was replaced as a defendant by the Acting Archivist of the
United States, Frank G. Burke. Congress, by the Archives and Records Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-497, § 107(d), 98 Stat. 2280, 2291 (1983), amended 1 U.S.C.
§§ 106(a)-(b), 112, 113, 201 (1982) to replace the Administrator of the General
Services Administration with the Archivist in the promulgation and the publi-
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rejected the Representatives' claim that the bill became law
without the President's signature and upheld the pocket veto. 10
The court of appeals reversed, ruling in Barnes v. Kline"' that
the Constitution does not permit intersession' 2 pocket vetoes
under 13modern rules and practices of intersession adjournments.
Barnes v. Kline adds a new chapter to the troublesome history of the presidential pocket veto power. This Comment contends that although the Barnes court reached the correct result,
it did so only by mischaracterizing, and thereby avoiding, a controlling precedent. Part I discusses the three major pre-Barnes
decisions interpreting the language and scope of the pocket
veto clause. Part II demonstrates that the Barnes court mischaracterized these prior decisions, especially when it found
that a controlling precedent was based on policy rather than on
constitutional grounds and was therefore distinguishable. Part
III argues that this controlling precedent, although still prevailing law, was itself wrongly decided. The Comment concludes
that the Supreme Court should expressly overrule that case
and adopt the Barnes result, thereby effectuating the policies
behind the pocket veto clause and striking an appropriate balance between presidential and congressional power.
I. PERSPECTIVES ON THE POCKET VETO
Although factually distinct, cases concerning the pocket
cation process. The sections of the Act appear as amended at 1 U.S.C.A.
§§ 106(a)-(b), 112, 113, 201 (West 1985). For a discussion of the publication procedure, see J. KERNoCHAN, THE LEGISLATrVE PRocss 53 (1981).
The Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the House Bipartisan Leadership Group subsequently intervened in the suit. Barnes, 582 F. Supp. at 164.
10. Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
11. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), revg Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163
(D.D.C. 1984), cert granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
12. The pocket veto power may only be exercised during adjournments of
Congress, and is therefore confined by the limited types of adjournments. A
"final" adjournment occurs when Congress ends its second session and technically ceases to exist. Congress also adjourns between the first and the second
sessions for what is called an "intersession adjournment." Adjournments during a session are called "intrasession" adjournments. Each individual house
can also take an intrasession adjournment while the other house remains in
session under art. I, § 5, cl. 4 of the Constitution. Under this provision, however, adjournments are limited to three days without the consent of the other
house. U.S. CONST art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
13. Barnes,759 F.2d at 41.
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veto present common issues. Each court has had to determine
whether the pocket veto clause applied and, if so, whether the
adjournment "prevented" the President from returning the
bill. A central issue has been whether the President may "constructively" return a bill to Congress by delivering it to an
agent of the originating house during an adjournment. If the
President may constructively return a bill, the adjournment
does not prevent the return, and the President cannot exercise
a pocket veto. The bill becomes law unless the President returns it to the congressional agent within ten days.
There are three major pre-Barnes decisions addressing the
pocket veto question and the issue of constructive return. In
the 1929 Pocket Veto Case,14 Congress presented a bill to the
President and took a five-month intersession 15 adjournment. 16
The Supreme Court, in its pioneering interpretation of the
pocket veto clause, identified the pivotal issue as that of determining what prevents the President from returning a bill during an adjournment.' 7 The Court found a "constitutional
14. The Okanagon, Methow, San Poelis (or San Poil), Nespelem, Colville,
and Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of the State of Washington v. United States,
279 U.S. 655 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Pocket Veto Case]. The disputed bill,
S.3185, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 CONG. REC. 10,616-17 (1926), involving Indian
claims, was presented to the President on June 24, 1926. On July 3, 1926, the
69th Congress adjourned its first session sine die, literally an adjournment
"without day." An adjournment sine die denotes an adjournment at the end
of either session of each Congress. Neither house of Congress was in session
on July 6, the tenth day after the bill had been presented to the President
(Sundays excepted), and the second session did not commence until early December. The Indian tribes made claims under the bill, arguing that it was not
lawfully pocket vetoed and therefore became law without the President's signature. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 672-73. By the term of the adjournment
resolution, the House of Representatives adjourned sine die, and the Senate
adjourned until November 10, 1926, when it met and adjourned sine die.
Although the Senate reconvened for that one day, the Court in the Pocket
Veto Case considered the July 3rd adjournment a sine die adjournment ending
the first session. Id- at 672 n.1. Congress, in this case, set a date for reassembly, although technically this is impossible under a sine die adjournment.
See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 24 n.7; Note, The PresidentialVeto Power: A Shallow
Pocke4 70 MICH. L. REv. 148, 152 nn.22-23 (1971). Subsequent courts have also
considered that in the Pocket Veto Case, the 69th Congress adjourned its first
session sine die on July 3rd. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
15. For a definition of "intersession" adjournment, see supra note 12.
16. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 672-73.
17. Both the petitioner and an amicus curiae argued that the word "adjournment" in the pocket veto clause refers to only a final adjournment. See
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 659, 667. The Court rejected this interpretation
and found that the numerous uses of the word adjournment in the Constitution demonstrate that "adjournment" was not intended to be qualified by the
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mandate" in article I, section 7 that a vetoed bill must be returned to a house formally in session, capable of recording the
President's objections on its official journal, and capable of proceeding to reconsider the veto.18 The adjournment prevented
the return, and a valid pocket veto resulted because the
originating house could not meet the constitutional mandate of
article I, section 7.19

The Court rejected the argument that the President could
constructively return the bill to an agent during the adjournment, reasoning that the originating house, not being in session,
could not receive, record, or reconsider the vetoed bill as the
Constitution requires. 20 The Court also reasoned that as a
matter of policy, an agent should not hold a vetoed bill in
"suspended animation" for "days, weeks or perhaps months,"
word "final." I& at 680. The Court did not, however, find the type of adjournment relevant to its reasoning or to its holdingWe think that under the constitutional provision the determinative
question in reference to an "adjournment" is not whether it is a final
adjournment of Congress or an interim adjournment .... but whether
it is one that "prevents" the President from returning the bill to the
House in which it originated within the time allowed.
Id- The Court also rejected an argument that the ten-day deliberation period
consisted of legislative days rather than of calendar days, id. at 679-80, an argument that would allow the President to return bills when Congress reconvened following an adjournment.
18. Essentially, the Court construed the pocket veto clause within the
context of art. I, § 7, cl. 2 as a whole. The Court noted that art. I, § 7, cl. 2
requires that if the President disapproves of a bill, "'he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.'"
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2). The
Court reasoned that:
Since the bill is to be returned to the same "House," and none other,
that is to enter the President's objections on its journal and proceeded
(sic] to reconsider the bill-there being only one and the same reference to such House-it follows, in our opinion, that under the constitutional mandate it is to be returned to the "House" when sitting in
an organized capacity for the transaction of business, and having authority to receive the return, enter the President's objections on its
journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill ....
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 682-83.
The argument that the originating house must be in session to receive vetoed bills was suggested decades earlier by Attorney General Devens in a
memorandum to President Hayes. See Memorandum from Attorney General
Devens to President Hayes (quoted in 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 503, 506 (1892) (opinion of Att'y Gen. Miller)).
19. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 684, 691-92.
20. Id. at 683-84. The Court also noted that Congress had never authorized an agent, but that such authorization would still not comply with the constitutional mandate. I&. at 684.
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creating uncertainty about the bill's status and undue delay in
its reconsideration. 21 Moreover, the Court found that a long
history of executive practice supported the validity of intersession pocket vetoes, and it cited 119 such vetoes never challenged by Congress. 22 The critical lesson of the Pocket Veto
Case, however, is that the Court found the possibility of constructive return to be constitutionally insignificant 2s because
article I, section 7 requires the President to return a bill to a
house in session. 4
Nine years later, in Wright v. United States,5 the pocket
21. Id. The Court stated:
[P]lainly the object of the constitutional provision [is] that there
should be a timely return of the bill, which should not only be a matter of official record definitely shown by the journal of the House itself, giving public, certain and prompt knowledge as to the status of
the bill, but should enable Congress to proceed immediately with its
reconsideration; and that the return of the bill should be an actual
and public return to the House itself, and not a fictious return by a
delivery of the bill to some individual ....
I. at 684-85.
22. I& at 690. The Court reasoned:
[A] practice of at least twenty years duration "on the part of the executive department, acquiesced in by the legislative department, while
not absolutely binding on the judicial department, is entitled to great
regard in determining the true construction of a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is in any respect of doubtful meaning."
Id. (quoting State v. South Norwalk, 17 Conn. 257, 264, 58 A. 759, 761 (1904)).
The Court also found it significant that Congress had only once attempted to
authorize a return during an adjournment and rejected the attempt on constitutional grounds in accordance with the Court's constitutional view of the
pocket veto clause. See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 685-87 n.11.
23. "Constitutionally insignificant" is the best description of the Court's
view of constructive return in the Pocket Veto Case. The Court did not actually prohibit the President from delivering a vetoed bill to an agent. Instead,
the Court's constitutional construction makes such a return ineffective in that
the Constitution would not recognize the act as a return because the house
must be formally in session to receive a vetoed bill. See Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. at 682-85.
24. Id. at 681-83.
25. 302 U.S. 583 (1938). The disputed bill, S. 713, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1936), granted jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to rehear and to adjudicate
petitioner Wright's claim against the federal government. The bill, originating
in the Senate, was presented to the President on April 24, 1936, and on May
4th, the Senate adjourned until May 7th. The House of Representatives remained in session. The President returned the bill to the Secretary of the
Senate with a veto message on May 5th, the last day the President had to return the bill. When the Senate reconvened on May 7th, the Secretary advised
the Senate that the President had returned the bill. The President of the Senate laid the Secretary's letter before the Senate and read the President's veto
message, whereupon the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Claims.
No further action was taken on the bill. See Wright 302 U.S. at 585-86. This
case presents a somewhat different factual situation than the other cases con-
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veto issue again reached the Supreme Court. In Wright, the
originating house had adjourned intrasession under article I,
section 5, clause 4,26 which permits one house to adjourn for no
more than three days without the consent of the other house.2
The President constructively returned a bill with his veto
message on the ninth day after presentment. The petitioner
Wright argued that the President's constructive return was invalid under the Pocket Veto Case and that, therefore, the attempt to veto the bill failed. Furthermore, argued Wright, the
bill was not validly pocket vetoed because the Constitution permits a pocket veto only when "Congress" adjourns, and in this
case, only one house had adjourned. Therefore, because the
President could neither return nor pocket veto the bill, it became law without the President's signature after the deliberation period expired.2 8
The Supreme Court agreed with Wright's argument that an
article I, section 5 "recess" did not constitute an adjournment
by Congress within the terms of the pocket veto clause, and
that therefore, the clause did not govern the Wight situation.29
The Court disagreed, however, with the argument that the
President could not constructively return the bill during an arsidering the pocket veto because the President actually attempted to return
the disputed bill, and the Court had to determine if the return was valid.
26. Wright 302 U.S. at 589.
27. Art. I, § 5, cl. 4 reads: "Neither House, during the Session of Congress,
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days
... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. (To ease reading, this provision will hereinafter be referred to as "article I, section 5" in the text and "art. I, § 5, cl. 4" in
the footnotes).
28. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, 10-12, Wright v. United States, 302 U.S.
583 (1938). Essentially, the petitioner attempted to find a gap in the Constitution where the President had no veto power. That is, if the President could
neither return nor pocket veto a bill, it would become law despite the President's disapproval.
29. The Court stated that art. I, § 1 defines "Congress" as the Senate and
the House of Representatives, rendering inapplicable the pocket veto language
which refers to an adjournment by "Congress." The Court supported this position by noting that art. I, § 7, cl. 2 carefully distinguishes action taken by an
individual house and that taken by Congress as a whole. The Court concluded
that this deliberate choice of words by the Framers of the Constitution meant
that an adjournment of Congress within the meaning of the pocket veto clause
must mean only an adjournment by both houses. See Wright 302 U.S. at 58788. A concurring opinion by Justice Stone found the majority's reasoning a
"meticulously grammatical interpretation" inconsistent with the purpose of
the Constitution. Id. at 607 (Stone, J., concurring). According to Justice
Stone, the Framers were only concerned that the action of the originating
house could block the President's return of a bill through adjournment. Id. at
606-09.
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ticle I, section 5 recess. The Court noted that because the
pocket veto clause did not apply, any observations in the Pocket
Veto Case that could have a bearing on the facts in Wright
were taken out of context and, therefore, not controlling.30 In
short, the rejection of constructive return in the Pocket Veto
Case did not control the Wight question. The Court then
ruled that the bill was validly returned to an agent of the
originating house during the article I, section 5 recess. 31 Because Congress failed to override the veto, the bill did not become law.
The Wright Court found the analysis of constructive return set forth in the Pocket Veto Case unpersuasive in the context of a single-house recess of three days or less. The Court
noted that the dangers of uncertainty and delay raised in the
Pocket Veto Case were nonexistent in Wright because the organization of the originating house and its appropriate officers
remained in place, and the short recess ensured a minimal delay in reconsideration. 32 It emphasized that the practical considerations in favor of constructive return 33 would, in this
situation, give full effect to the respective roles of Congress and
the President in the legislative process.3 Finally, the Court declined to speculate whether it would apply the same analysis to
a single-house adjournment requiring the consent of the other
5
house.3
30.

Wrigh 302 U.S. at 593-94.

31. Id at 598.
32. Id at 595-96.
33. Id at 589-90. The Court quoted extensively from the amicus brief for
the petitioner in the Pocket Veto Case concerning practical considerations in
favor of constructive return. Id at 590-92. The Court did not find it inconsistent to employ the arguments rejected in the Pocket Veto Case, reasoning that
"[t]he fact that [the amicus's] contention in the Pocket Veto Case was unavailing... in no way detracts from the pertinence and cogency of these observations as addressed to the situation which is now presented." Id at 593.
34. Id at 596-97. The Court emphasized that the roles of the President
and of Congress in the legislative process are best preserved by careful attention to the fundamental purpose behind the veto provision as a whole: "(1)
that the President shall have suitable opportunity to consider the bills ... (2)
that the Congress shall have suitable opportunity to consider his objections...
and ... pass [bills] over his veto." Id, Validating the constructive return
would fulfill this purpose because the President would retain the full ten days
for deliberation while Congress would still retain the ability to override the
veto.
35. Id at 598. Under the terms of the Constitution, any single house adjournment for more than three days would require consent of the other house.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
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In Kennedy v. Sampson,36 the final

7

case preceding

Barnes, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that a five-day intrasession adjournment by both
houses of Congress did not prevent President Nixon from constructively returning a bill.38 Finding Wright a "significant
exception '3 9 to the Pocket Veto Case, the court interpreted
Wright as permitting constructive return if the procedure does
not pose the dangers of delay and uncertainty envisioned in the

Pocket Veto Case.40 Applying the standard it derived from
Wright, the court approved constructive return during all in-

trasession adjournments, based on its finding that the brevity of
such adjournments and the advent of modem communications
minimize delay and uncertainty.4 Discerning no substantive
distinction between the two-house adjournment in Kennedy
and the single-house adjournment in Wright, the court con-

cluded that Kennedy was a "logical extension '' 42 of the Wright
exception to the Pocket Veto Case.43 The court held that no in36. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The disputed bill, S. 3418, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 41,289 (1970), entitled the "Family Practice of Medicine
Act," was presented to the President on December 14, 1970. On December
22nd, both houses adjourned for the Christmas holidays-the Senate until December 28th, and the House of Representatives until December 29th. Prior to
adjourning, the Senate, the originating house, authorized the Secretary of the
Senate to receive presidential messages during the adjournment. On December 24th, President Nixon announced that he would withhold his signature
from the bill. As in Barnes, the plaintiffs in Kennedy sought to have a bill
published as law. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432.
37. Another case concerning an intrasession pocket veto, Kennedy v.
Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976), came before the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in 1976. The opinion, however, resolved
only standing and mootness issues and did not address the merits of the pocket
veto issue. Id. at 355-56. Once the standing issue was resolved, the parties
agreed to a consent judgment against the executive branch. Id. at 356.
Although the consent judgment is not authoritative on the merits of the
pocket veto issue and has no precedential effect, one commentator believes
that Kennedy v. Jones has value as a concession by the President that the
pocket veto power is inapplicable to a longer intrasession adjournment (31
days) than the court faced in Kennedy v. Sampson (5 days). See Kennedy,
Congress, Presidentand the Pocket Veto, 63 VA. L. REv. 355, 377 (1977).
38. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 442.
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id. at 438-39.
41. Id. at 441-42.
42. Id. at 440.
43. See id. at 439-40. The court added that any reliance on the Pocket
Veto Case was misplaced because of the dissimilarity between modern intrasession adjournments and intersession adjournments at the time of the Pocket
Veto Case. Id. at 440-41. In particular, the court emphasized the brevity of
modern intersession adjournments, id., and included an appendix to the opin-
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trasession adjournment can prevent a return if the originating
house makes arrangements for constructive return.44 Thus, the
Kennedy decision effectively restricted use of the pocket veto to
intersession and final adjournments.
These three cases set the precedential context for the decision in Barnes v. Kline.45 In the Pocket Veto Case, the Court
determined that when Congress adjourns between sessions, it
prevents the President from returning a bill because the Constitution requires that Congress be formally in session to receive the return.46 The Wright decision determined that a
single-house adjournment under article I, section 5 constitutes a
recess, not an adjournment governed by the pocket veto clause,
and that the President can constructively return a bill if the
procedure does not cause delay and uncertainty. 4 7 The Kennedy court followed what it perceived as the Wright exception
to the Pocket Veto Case and allowed constructive return during
4
all intrasession adjournments.
The Barnes case presented virtually the same question as
the Pocket Veto Case,49 and the court could have invalidated the
intersession pocket veto only by distinguishing this apparently
controlling precedent. The district court concluded that neither
Wright nor Kennedy deprived the Pocket Veto Case of controlling force50 and, finding itself bound by the Pocket Veto Case,
ion showing the duration and frequency of intrasession adjournments since
1789. Id. at 442-45 app.
44. IML at 442. The rule enunciated in Kennedy v. Sampson demands that
the houses of Congress have regularized procedures for receipt of bills by an
agent during adjournments. Id at 442. It is unclear how the Kennedy court
derived this condition. Neither the Pocket Veto Case Court nor the Wright
Court found the express authorization determinative in judging the merits of
constructive return.
45. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert grantedsub nom. Burke v. Barnes,
54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
46. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681-83.
47. Wrigh 302 U.S. at 587-89, 594-96.
48. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 442.
49. Compare Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 674 ("The specific question
here presented is whether, within the meaning of [art. I, § 7, cl. 2] Congress by
the [intersession] adjournment on July 3rd prevented the President from returning the bill within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it had been presented
to him.") with Barnes, 759 F.2d at 23 ("The precise issue at stake is whether
the adjournment of the Ninety-eighth Congress at the end of its first session
'prevented' return of a bill presented to the President on the day of adjournment .... ").
50. Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163, 168-69 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom.
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
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upheld the intersession pocket veto of H.R. 4042. 51
The court of appeals reversed, 52 finding that only concerns
about uncertainty and delay led the Supreme Court to deny the
effectiveness of constructive return in the Pocket Veto Case.5 3
The appellate court read Wright as establishing a rule that constructive return is permissible in the absence of those concerns.M Reasoning that Wright expressly left open the possible
expansion of its analysis beyond a brief one-house adjournment, the Barnes court found that constructive return is perissible during intersession adjournments if it does not cause
undue delay in the reconsideration of the bill or uncertainty
55
about the bill's status.
In applying this principle to the facts in Barnes, the appellate court found no substantive distinction between modem
intersession adjournments and intrasession adjournments sufficient to justify a departure from the rulings in Wright and
Kennedy.56 The court did not consider the nine-week delay in
Barnes comparable to the five-month delay in the Pocket Veto
Case, and it found that other modern congressional practices diminished the delay problem.5 7 Turning to the uncertainty issue, the court echoed Wright and Kennedy, noting that during
an intersession adjournment, the organization of each house of
Congress remains unchanged, and their respective staffs continue to function. 58 The court also noted that both houses now
have regularized procedures for accepting and recording the receipt of vetoed bills during adjournment. 59 Finally, although
the court acknowledged that clear rules respecting the pocket
51. Id. at 169.
52. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 41. The first part of the majority opinion consid-

ered whether members of Congress have standing to challenge a pocket veto.
Id at 25-30. This issue prompted an extensive dissent from Judge Bork. Id. at
41-71 (Bork, J., dissenting). Although important on its own merits, the stand-

ing issue falls outside the scope of this Comment.
53.

Id at 33, 35.

54. Id at 34-35. The Court found the primary significance of Wright was
establishing that (1) the President must truly be deprived of his opportunity to
veto a bill before concluding that an adjournment prevents a return and (2)

the mere absence of the originating house does not prevent a return if there is
an authorized agent to receive the return and such a procedure does not create

the delay and uncertainty feared in the Pocket Veto Case. Id. at 34.
55. Id at 34-35.
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id-These modern practices include congressional rules mandating the
carryover of legislative business between sessions, the ability of committees to
meet during adjournments, and the ability to assemble on short notice.

58. Id at 30, 36-37.
59. Id at 37 n.31.
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veto would be desirable, it refused to declare intersession
pocket vetoes per se invalid,60 concluding instead that their validity must be determined on a case-by-case basis according to
the factors identified in Wright and the Pocket Veto Case.61
II. BARNES IN PRECEDENTIAL CONTEXT:
FLAWED ANALYSIS
Both the courts in Barnes and the Pocket Veto Case faced
the identical constitutional question whether an intersession
adjournment prevents the President from returning a bill, thus
triggering a pocket veto. In Barnes v. Kline, the court permitted constructive return of a bfll, 62 whereas in the Pocket Veto
Case, the Court did not. 63 The different outcomes may be justi-

fied if the Court in the Pocket Veto Case conditioned the
permissibility of constructive return on some criteria met in
Barnes but not met in the Pocket Veto Case, or if Wright sufficiently modified or created an exception to the Pocket Veto
64
Case, enabling the Barnes court to distinguish that precedent.
A fair evaluation of the precedents reveals that neither approach justifies the Barnes court's departure from the Pocket
Veto Case.
To distinguish the holding in the Pocket Veto Case, the
Barnes court contended that the Supreme Court was concerned
only about delay and uncertainty when it rejected constructive
return.65 Finding that Wright "indisputably establishe[d]" the
permissibility of constructive return in the absence of delay and
60. Id. at 38, 41.
61. Id. at 41. The court did not prohibit pocket vetoes per se during intersession adjournments. Instead, the court indicated it would allow constructive
return only if Congress has a regularized procedure for receiving bills and
does nothing to obstruct the return. Id. at 41. These conditions would likely
be met by Congress because it has no incentive to invoke a pocket veto, which
deprives it of the opportunity to reconsider and override a veto. Therefore,
the rule in Barnes would effectively restrict pocket vetoes to final adjournments.
62. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 35-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub
nom Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
63. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 683-85 (1929).
64. Finding either a conditional rule or an exception to the rule in the
Pocket Veto Case would have the same result as allowing the Barnes court to
distinguish the Pocket Veto Case on a factual basis. Under either approach,
finding differences in the cases concerning the length of adjournment, changes
in congressional adjournment practices, changes in congressional rules, and
the existence of an authorized agent would permit dissimilar results in Barnes
and the Pocket Veto Case.
65. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 33.
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uncertainty, 66 the Barnes court derived the "simple" principle
that constructive return is effective if "such a procedure would
not occasion" these problems.6 7 The court viewed the decision
in Kennedy as an application of this principle to intrasession
adjournments. 68 The court went on to find that concerns about
uncertainty and delay were similarly absent in modern intersession adjournments; therefore, constructive return was permissible. 69 Thus, the court viewed the cases as reconcilable
because Wright, Kennedy, and Barnes satisfied a conditional
70
rule set forth in the Pocket Veto Case.
The Barnes analysis, however, entirely mischaracterized
the rejection of constructive return in the Pocket Veto Case.
The Pocket Veto Case Court interpreted article I, section 7 as
requiring Congress to receive a vetoed bill while formally in
session, when capable of recording the return on its journal,
and when able to reconsider it. 71 A rejection of constructive return inevitably follows because even if an agent were actually
to receive a vetoed bill, the originating house could neither record nor reconsider the bill in accordance with the "constitutional mandate" identified by the Court. The Barnes court thus
contravened the holding in the Pocket Veto Case by ignoring its
constitutional basis.
Although in the Pocket Veto Case the Court reasoned that
constructive return would cause undue delay in reconsideration
and uncertainty about the bill's status,7 2 this argument was
merely a secondary policy justification reinforcing the Court's
constitutional interpretation. Consequently, neither the relative brevity of modem intersession adjournments nor modern
congressional practices mitigating uncertainty are sufficient to
distinguish the holding in Barnes from that in the Pocket Veto
Case.
The Barnes decision could also rest upon a finding that the
Wright Court established an exception to the bar against constructive return announced in the Pocket Veto Case, and that
Barnes falls within that exception. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit
reasoned in Kennedy that Wright created an exception to the
Pocket Veto Case, permitting return to an agent during an ad66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Ia
la
Id
Ia
Ia

at 34.
at 34, 35.
at 34.
at 32-35.

71. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681-83.

72. Id. at 683-84.
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journment if the procedure does not create uncertainty about a
bill's status or undue delay in its reconsideration. 73 The Kennedy court argued that its decision was a "logical extension" of
Wright and permitted constructive return during all intrasession adjournments.7 4 By permitting return even during intersession adjournments, the D.C. Circuit in Barnes would further
enlarge the Wright exception to the Pocket Veto Case.
For Wright to establish an exception to the Pocket Veto
Case, however, the two decisions must conflict over the permis-

sibility of constructive return during adjournments governed by
the pocket veto clause in article I, section 7. In fact, the cases
are harmonious, not because the opinion in the Pocket Veto
Case conditionally rejected constructive return and the facts in
Wright met these conditions, but because the Wright Court
was dealing with a unilateral recess under article I, section 5.
The cases thus create separate rules on related but distinct
contexts.
The Pocket Veto Case Court held that if Congress has adjourned, a pocket veto is possible because the Constitution requires that a bill be returned to a house formally in session.7 5
The Court in Wright, however, held that in the event of a unilateral recess under article I, section 5, Congress has not adjourned, and the pocket veto clause does not apply.76 The
President can, in this limited circumstance, constructively deliver a bill when one house is not formally in session.7 7 The
cases are thus consistent. The Wright decision did not retreat
from the basic premise of the Pocket Veto Case that an intersession adjournment prevents return of a bill within the meaning
of the pocket veto clause. Rather, the Wright decision only
narrowed the scope of the pocket veto clause by defining "adjournment," and it provided a procedural rule for situations in
which the clause is inapplicable.78 Furthermore, close examination of other aspects of the Wright opinion reveals that the
73. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

74. Id. at 440.
75. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681-83.
76. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587, 593 (1938).
77. Id. at 587-89, 598.
78. Id. A statement by Senator Edward Kennedy following President
Nixon's pocket veto that prompted the Kennedy case demonstrates the common misunderstanding of the relationship between Wright and the Pocket
Veto Case. Senator Kennedy stated that in Wright
there was no "adjournment" of Congress within the meaning of the
pocket veto clause... [and] the pocket veto clause was completely inapplicable. [T]he President was not "prevented" from returning the
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an exception to the rule laid
Court did not intend to create
79
down in the Pocket Veto Case.

vetoed bill ... within the meaning of the pocket veto clause, since the
Secretary of the Senate was available to receive [the bill].
116 CONG. REc. 44,482 (1970) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (emphasis added),
reprinted in The Pocket Veto Power: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as House Pocket Veto Hearings]. It is inconsistent to say a court found a constitutional provision inapplicable and then to contend that the court did not
find a violation of that provision. Because Wright found the pocket veto
clause did not apply to the facts, the Court could not determine that Congress
did not prevent a return under that clause because an agent was available to
receive the bill. Thus, the Pocket Veto Case remains the only interpretation by
the Court of what prevents a return when Congress adjourns. See House
Pocket Veto Hearings, supra, at 24-25 (testimony of Asst. Att'y Gen. William
H. Rehnquist). Some commentators have described the dismissal of constructive return in the Pocket Veto Case as dicta, see, e.g., Note, The Veto of S. 3418.
More CongressionalPower in the President'sPocket, 22 CATH. U.L. REy. 385,
392 (1973) (Wright retreated from dicta in the Pocket Veto Case that return
must be made to a house in session and therefore, constructive return would
be invalid), presumably because Congress had not appointed an agent and the
President in the Pocket Veto Case had not attempted a return to any agent.
Although perhaps technically unnecessary to the holding, the Court's rejection
of constructive return inevitably follows its requirement that the originating
house be physically in session to receive vetoed bills. See supra notes 20-21, 23
and accompanying text. Moreover, for the purposes of Barnes, it is irrelevant
whether the constructive return issue was dicta in the Pocket Veto Case. The
Court determined that the house must be in session to receive a bill (at the
very least for intersession adjournments), and because in Barnes the House
was not in session, the bill could not have been returned.
79. The Wright Court carefully distinguished the Pocket Veto Case, claiming it did "not regard that decision as applicable" because that case did not
consider the question presented in Wright and thus its analysis represented
only "general expressions without force" in a different context. Wight 302
U.S. at 593. The precise phrasing is important to understanding that the Court
did not intend to modify the Pocket Veto Case. In arguing that the Pocket Veto
Case did not control the facts presented in Wrigh the Court statedAny observations [in the Pocket Veto Case] which could be regarded
as having bearing upon the question now before us would be taken
out of their proper relation. The oft repeated admonition of Chief
Justice Marshall "that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are
used" ...

has special force in this instance.

Id at 593-94 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
The Court then stated. "In the Pocket Veto Case the Court expressed the view
that the House to which the bill is to be returned 'is the House in session! ....
But that expression should not be construed... to demand... that a return is
impossible during a recess." Wrigh 302 U.S. at 594 (quoting Pocket Veto
Case, 279 U.S. at 682) (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Court, the expression in the Pocket Veto Case denying constructive return during an adjournment did not preclude permitting return during a recess under art. I, § 5,
cl. 4. See Letter from William H. Rehnquist to Edward M. Kennedy (December 30, 1970), reprintedin House Pocket Veto Hearings,supra note 78, at 8 n.2.
The careful use of the term "recess" rather than adjournment throughout
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Read out of context, however, some of the language in
Wright does imply a repudiation of the Pocket Veto Case.8 0 In
the Wright opinion evidences the Court's desire to distinguish the cases. The
Court began by stating flatly: "'The Congress' did not adjourn. The Senate
alone was in recess." Wright, 302 U.S. at 587. The Court continued to use the
word "recess" throughout the opinion to describe the action of the originating
house. See, e.g., id. at 589 ("taking of such a recess is not an adjournment"); id.
at 592 ("absence of any practical obstacle to the return of a bill when the
House is in temporary recess"); id. at 595 ("when there is nothing but such a
temporary recess"). When referring to the Pocket Veto Case, the Wright
Court studiously used the term "adjournment." See, e.g., id at 593 ("In the
Pocket Veto Case, the Congress had adjourned."); id. at 594 ('The Court in the
Pocket Veto Case was impressed with the impropriety of delivery of the bill
by the President during a period of adjournment.").
The Court's narrow holding, confined to a unilateral recess under art. I,
§ 5, cl. 4, and its explicit refusal to speculate about an expansion of its analysis,
see id. at 598, suggests a strong intention not to affect the earlier decision in
the Pocket Veto Case. There is no support for the contention in Barnes that
Wright "expressly left open" an expansion of its analysis to all types of adjournments. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert granted sub
nom Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). The
Barnes opinion selectively edits the language in Wright to support this contention. Barnes quotes from Wright: "[C]ases may arise in which... a long period of adjournment may result. We have no such case before us ... ." Id.
(quoting Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 598 (1938)). The full text in
Wright reads:
We are not impressed with the argument that while a recess of one
House is limited to three days without the consent of the other House,
cases may arise in which the other House consents to an adjournment
and a long period of adjournment may result. We have no such case
before us ....
Wright, 302 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added). Thus, the only expansion of the
analysis envisioned by the Court would be application of the test to a single
house adjournment of more than three days where presumably the pocket
veto clause, and hence the analysis in the Pocket Veto Case, would not apply.
Moreover, Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion in Wright, stated that the
Court's refusal to rule on this gray area meant that the Court intended not to
expand its analysis. Id. at 601-02 (Stone, J., concurring). Justice Stone wrote:
"Doubts as to the scope and effect of the rule now announced by the Court are
multiplied by the intimation that a different rule may be applied in the case of
adjournment of either House of Congress, with the consent of the other, for
more than three days ... ." Id. Because the rule in Wright permitted constructive return, a "different rule" would have to disallow constructive return.
Only Justice Stone, joined by Justice Brandeis, found the Pocket Veto
Case and Wright indistinguishable, thereby concluding that the analysis in
Wright undercut the Pocket Veto Case. Id. at 602-04. By implication, Justice
Stone's disagreement strongly suggests that the rest of the Court found the
cases entirely distinguishable and that the Court did not intend Wright to
modify the Pocket Veto Case.
80. For example, Wright states that "[t]he Constitution does not define
what shall constitute a return of a bill or deny the use of appropriate agencies
in effecting the return." Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 589 (1938). The
Pocket Veto Case, however, says nothing to the contrary. See Pocket Veto
Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). The Pocket Veto Case did not construe the Constitu-
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particular, the opinion in Wright thoroughly explores the practicality of constructive return and quotes approvingly from an
amicus brief rejected in the Pocket Veto Case.8 ' It is important
to remember, however, that this discussion was necessary precisely because the Pocket Veto Case did not apply. After distinguishing the Pocket Veto Case and removing the constitutional
barrier to constructive return, the Wright Court still needed to
justify constructive return both as a practical and as a policy
matter. To this end, the Court focused on the practical and policy concerns about delay and uncertainty raised in the Pocket
Veto Case.8 2 Much of the opinion explains why the reasoning
of the Pocket Veto Case is inappropriate in the Wright context
because uncertainty and delay are "illusory" if a single house
recesses for three days or less. 3 The Court found it consistent
to employ the amicus analysis rejected in the Pocket Veto Case
because the cases involved wholly different situations8 4 Thus,
even though the Wright Court found constructive return appropriate as a matter of policy, 5 it did not and could not refute
the fundamental reasoning of the Pocket Veto Case because the
same constitutional issue was not before it.
The above analysis demonstrates that the Barnes court
could not distinguish the Pocket Veto Case simply by refuting
the policy concerns associated with constructive return. The
Court in the Pocket Veto Case erected a barrier to constructive
return based on constitutional grounds, 6 and not based on
grounds of policy and practicality. Moreover, the Barnes court
could not distinguish the Pocket Veto Case by citing an exception set forth in the Wright opinion; Wright did not address
the constitutional interpretation of article I, section 7, the basis
of the Pocket Veto Case.
Under the Pocket Veto Case and Wright, if a court must resolve the status of a bill when one or both houses of Congress
tion to prohibit constructive return, but found it constitutionally insignificant
because a house must be in session to receive a vetoed bill. See iti at 682-85;
supra note 23. The Pocket Veto Case does "define what shall constitute the return of a bill," but only within the meaning of the pocket veto clause, Pocket

Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 672, not when that clause is inapplicable, as in Wright,
see Wright 302 U.S. at 587, 593. The statement, therefore, does not represent
a conflict between the cases.
81. See Wrigh4 302 U.S. at 590-92.
82. See i- at 594-95.
83. See i- at 590-93, 595.
at 593; supra note 33.

84.

See i-

85.

Wrigh4 302 U.S. at 595-96.

86.

See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681-83.
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are in adjournment on the tenth day after presentment, the
court must first determine whether Congress has adjourned. If
Congress has adjourned, the pocket veto clause applies, and the
court must follow the Pocket Veto Case. If, however, Congress
has not adjourned and if only one house has recessed for three
days or less under article I, section 5, the court must follow
Wright.8 7 In Barnes, Congress clearly had adjourned under the

terms of the pocket veto clause. Therefore, Barnes fell
squarely under the holding of the Pocket Veto Case, and the
President validly pocket-vetoed H.R. 4042.
III. REACHING THE CORRECT RESULT: EVALUATING
THE OUTCOME OF BARNES
Barnes v. Kline8s established narrow boundaries for the
pocket veto power by essentially restricting pocket veto opportunities to final adjournments. Although it misinterpreted precedent, the Barnes court reasoned persuasively that neither the
purpose of the pocket veto, the proper balance of powers in the
legislative process, nor sound policy support a broad interpretation of the pocket veto clause.8 9
In the Pocket Veto Case, the Court broadly construed the
pocket veto power, requiring return to a house formally in session 90 and thereby effectively barring constructive return. A
rigorous examination of the opinion, however, reveals questionable constitutional interpretation, logical inconsistency, and the
absence of compelling authority. As the following discussion
demonstrates, only the bare holding of the Pocket Veto Case re87. The cases leave a gray area because the Wright court refused to rule
on the effect of a single-house adjournment for more than three days which
would require the consent of the nonadjourning house. Evidence suggests that
the Court would consider this an adjournment within the meaning of the
pocket veto clause. See supranote 79. In Barnes,the executive branch argued
that the act of consent by the nonadjourning house would make this an adjournment of Congress because both houses would then have approved the adjournment. Brief for the Appellees at 54-56, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar.
4, 1986) (No. 85-781). Ruling otherwise could create an anomalous situation.
For example, if one house adjourned for a month the President would have to
constructively return a vetoed bill, but if both houses adjourned for five days
the President could not constructively return the bill. A ruling that Wright is
limited to a maximum three-day unilateral recess would avoid this potentially
illogical situation.
88. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom Burke v. Barnes,
54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
89. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 30-31, 36-37, 39, 41.
90. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 681-83 (1929).
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mains, and the Supreme Court has ample reason to overrule
that unsound holding and to adopt the correct outcome9 1 in

Barnes.
The Pocket Veto Case opinion suggests three reasons for
permitting intersession pocket vetoes and for refusing to allow
constructive return of a bill to an agent during an adjournment.
First, the Court reasoned that the consistent executive practice
of intersession pocket vetoes, historically acquiesced to by Congress, supported its conclusion.9 2 The courts in Wright, Kennedy, and Barnes, however, correctly rejected longstanding
practice as a persuasive guide for interpreting the pocket veto
clause. 93 The Supreme Court consistently has held that past
practice cannot enlarge or diminish constitutional powers, or
abrogate constitutional provisions. 94 Thus, past executive practice, a supplementary argument at best, cannot adequately support the holding of the Pocket Veto Case.
The Court in the Pocket Veto Case also objected to constructive return because it would delay reconsideration of returned bills and would create uncertainty about their status.
The issue of delay is of questionable relevance because the Con91. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
92. Id at 688-91.
93. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 597-98 (1938) ("We agree...
that the precedents of Executive action which have been cited are not persuasive. The question now raised has not been the subject of judicial decision and
must be resolved not by past uncertainties, assumptions or arguments,, but by
the application of the controlling principles of constitutional interpretation.");
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("consistent practice
cannot create or destroy an executive power"). The court in Barnes first denied that past practice was conclusive, Barnes, 759 F.2d at 39, but later inconsistently argued that recent presidential practice creates a modern executive
practice useful in determining the pocket veto issue, id. at 37 n.32. Modern
practice, however, has no more relevance than traditional practice in reaching
the correct constitutional interpretation of the pocket veto clause.
94. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
957-59 (1983). For 150 years the President had gone to Congress on the last
day of each session to sign bills, in the belief that a President could not approve legislation after adjournment. The Supreme Court clarified this longstanding misconception first in La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 423, 454-55 (1899), and extended its holding to permit approval of bills after final adjournments in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 492-94 (1932).
In Edwards, the Court recognized the possible existence of a practical construction of such force as to be determinative, but found even the century-old
practice inconclusive. See ii at 487; see also Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp.
v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 631-632 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (Whittaker, J., concurring)
(recognizing customary procedures in exchange of bills between President and
Congress having partial but not controlling authority in presentment of bills
during President's absence from country), cert denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965).
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stitution does not require immediate reconsideration of vetoed
bills, and return to a house in session would not necessarily ensure more rapid reconsideration than if an agent had received
96
the return.9 5 Moreover, in light of current congressional rules

and the increasingly shorter intersession adjournments taken
by Congress, 97 the delay problem is of diminished practical
importance.
The courts in Wright, Barnes, and Kennedy adequately refuted the argument that allowing constructive return to an
agent would generate uncertainty about a bill's status. The
continuity of modem congressional organization, the existence
of secure procedures for receiving and recording returned bills,
and the sophistication of modem communications preclude any
reasonable concern for uncertainty. 98 The policy considerations
95. Had the Framers considered immediate reconsideration of vetoed bills
important, they could easily have set some time limit on Congress's power to
override a veto. The fact that they did not implies that delay in the legislative
process was not of great concern.
As a practical matter, bills returned to an agent shortly after an adjournment suffer no more delay in reconsideration than bills returned just prior to
adjournment. In both cases reconsideration would undoubtedly begin only
when Congress reconvenes. Even if Congress presented the traditional avalanche of bills prior to adjournment and then waited the ten days in order to
preclude the opportunity for a pocket veto, see infra note 131, no reduction in
delay would be achieved. It is exceedingly doubtful that Congress would immediately begin reconsideration of any vetoed bills. Thus, for practical purposes, denying constructive return and requiring return to a house in session
does not reduce delay in reconsideration.
96. For a discussion of modern congressional practices that mitigate delay
in reconsideration, including rules for priority reconsideration of vetoed bills,
convening of committees during adjournments, and expedited reassembly, see
Barnes, 759 F.2d at 36.
97. The Barnes court noted that the average length of modern intersession adjournments is four weeks. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 36. The nine-week
adjournment in Barnes was therefore longer than the average. Id Since the
75th Congress, the length of intersession adjournments have ranged from less
than one day to 4 1/4 months. See Joint Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant and
Senate Intervenor Appellant at 63-67, app. I., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582
(U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). The trend historically, however, is clearly toward shorter adjournments. Since the Pocket Veto Case, Congress has taken
31 intersession adjournments, twelve lasting less than a month, five lasting
one to two months, seven lasting two to four months, six lasting four to five
months, and one lasting more than five months. Id. For a complete listing of
all intersession adjournments since the First Congress and their respective
lengths, see id. The adoption of the 20th amendment has also reduced the
time between adjournments by eliminating a "lame duck" session. See Barnes,
759 F.2d ht 36 n.26.
98. See Wright 302 U.S. at 591, 595; Barnes, 759 F.2d at 36-37; Kennedy,
511 F.2d at 441. The Court in the Pocket Veto Case expressed concern that re-

1986]

POCKET VETO

1169

of delay and uncertainty, therefore, do not sufficiently support
the holding in the Pocket Veto Case.
Thus, all that remains of the Court's reasoning in the
Pocket Veto Case is its central contention, based on its interpretation of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. Yet, the interpretation that the originating house must be formally in session
to receive a veto contradicts the constitutional text. The Court
correctly reasoned that the determinative question with regard
to a pocket veto is not the type of adjournment involved, but
rather whether an adjournment prevents a return. Having
identified "prevent" as the critical word, however, the analysis
in the Pocket Veto Case effectively read it out of the constitutional text.99 If the originating house must be in session for the
turn to an agent was not an act of sufficient notoriety to inform the public of
the bill's status and that questions might arise whether the bill was returned
at all. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 685-86 (1929). The Court in Wrigh4

however, quoting from the amicus in the Pocket Veto Case, observed that Congress has "'officers and agents of great power and responsibility... who are
constantly in their places when the Houses are in session, and when they are
not in session."' Wrigh4 302 U.S. at 591 (quoting Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S.
at 669 (amicus's argument)). As the Barnes court observed, the organization of
Congress remains intact and unchanged between sessions. See Barnes, 759
F.2d at 37. Congress's regularized procedures for constructive receipt of vetoed bills adds security to the procedure, see id. at 34, although the addition of
these procedures alone is not enough to justify the Barnes court's departure
from the holding in the Pocket Veto Case. See supra note 44. In another context, the Court has stated that officers of Congress may perform the function
of "receipt and dissemination." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976).
As for the public notoriety of constructive return, the receiving agent
makes a formal record of the return which is accessible to interested parties.
See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 37. Moreover, informal sources also ensure public
knowledge of a veto during an adjournment. Presidents commonly accompany
vetoes with veto messages that are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, see infra note 126, and, more importantly, the media
often report vetoes. For example, the pocket veto of H.R. 4042 was reported in
the press. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1983, at A17, col. 1. Thus, the status of a bill
returned during an intersession adjournment essentially generates no more
uncertainty than a bill returned while Congress is in session. See Kennedy,
511 F.2d at 441.
The importance for public notoriety of a return is open to question as well
because other steps in the legislative process do not require a public act. For
example, the Constitution does not suggest the need for a formal, visible public act either when the President approves legislation or when Congress
presents a bill to the President. See C. ZINN, AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL PRO-

cEDuRE 25-26 (1957).
99. Essentially, the house in session requirement rewrites the provision
stating that a bill becomes law after 10 days "unless Congress by their adjournmentprevent its return" to read "unless Congressadjourns." See Barnes
v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
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President to return a bill, any adjournment on the tenth day
would automatically prevent a return and would trigger a
pocket veto opportunity. The Constitution, however, does not
state that adjournment will always prevent a return. 0 0 Rather,
it states what happens if an adjournment does prevent a return.10 1 Taken to its logical extreme, the house-in-session requirement could mean that anytime Congress adjourns and is
not physically in session on the tenth day after presentment,
regardless of the length of adjournment, the President will be
prevented from returning a bill. Because Congress adjourns
each day, the Court's interpretation of article I, section 7 arguably subjects virtually every piece of legislation to a pocket
veto,
10 2
a situation plainly not intended by the Constitution.
Moreover, the Pocket Veto Case Court's interpretation is
constitutionally unnecessary. Although article I, section 7
states that upon disapproval, the President will return a bill to
the originating house, "who shall enter the Objections at large
on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it,"'10 3 the provision,

correctly interpreted, requires only that the originating house
perform these tasks at some time. 0 4 Nothing in the Constitution demands that Congress have the ability to immediately
begin reconsideration upon return, and nothing in the Constitution precludes informal receipt of a vetoed bill by an agent
and subsequent formal recording of the veto in the official
journal.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Pocket Veto Case
lacked supporting authority at the time it was decided. The
Court derived the house-in-session requirement primarily from
100.
101.

See supra note 7.
See supra note 7.

102. In Barnes, the executive branch retreats from this view of the Pocket
Veto Case, arguing that a bright line for the validity of pocket vetoes be drawn
at three-day adjournments because the Framers distinguished adjournments
not requiring action by both houses in art. I, § 5, cl. 4. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 3940; supra note 87. The executive branch's argument reflects its discomfort
with the Pocket Veto Case. As the Barnes court noted, this argument was proposed because the executive branch "could not credibly argue for the extreme
position that every adjournment... creates an opportunity for a valid pocket
veto." Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert grantedsub nom.
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). Regardless
of the argument by the executive branch, the holding of Pocket Veto Case
makes every adjournment by Congress a pocket veto opportunity simply because Congress cannot receive a bill during an adjournment under that ruling.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. For the text of this clause, see supra note
7.
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas,10 5 an earlier case dealing with a different provision of article I, section 7.106 In that
case, the Court held that an override vote by two-thirds of each
house required only a quorum "entitled to exert legislative
power," and not a vote by two-thirds of the entire membership. 0 7 Finding no distinction between "that house" which
must receive, record and reconsider a vetoed bill and "that
house" which votes to override a veto, the Court in the Pocket
Veto Case concluded that the house must be formally in session
for the President to return a bill.10 8 The Court's tenuous analogy, assuming complete definitional identity between the various uses of the term "house" in article I, section 7,109 ignored
the qualitative distinction between a formal vote requiring an
exercise of legislative power and receipt of a bill that does
not. n The house that receives a vetoed bill need not have the
same status as the house that votes to override the veto. Moreover, the Court in its earlier Missouri Pacific ruling explicitly
105. 248 U.S. 276 (1919).
106. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 682 (citing Missouri Pacific, 248 U.S. at

280).
107. Missouri Pacific, 248 U.S. at 280-82.
108. Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 683. In Missouri Pacif, the Court
identified the issue before it as whether the reference to "that house" which
must agree to override a veto under art. I, § 7, cl. 2 relates to
the two houses by which the bill was passed and upon which full legislative power is conferred by the Constitution in the case of the presence of a quorum . . . or whether ["that house"] refer[s] to a body
which must be assumed to embrace ... all its members, for the purpose of estimating the two-thirds vote required [for an override].
Missouri Pacific, 248 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added). The Court in the Pocket
Veto Case noted that the phrase "that house" is also used in reference to the
return of a veto in art. I, § 7, cl. 2. See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 683. Art.
I, § 7, cl. 2 states that upon disapproval, "[the President] shall return [a bill]
with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter their objections ... and proceed to reconsider it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
cl. 2.
109. Since the Court in MissouriPacific defined "that house" as one in session in reference to the override vote, Missouri Pacific, 248 U.S. at 280, 281,
283, the Pocket Veto Case Court felt compelled to apply the same definition in
relation to the veto provisions. See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 682-83. The
Court in Missouri Pacific, however, in no way determined that the first reference to "that house" concerning return of bills has complete definitional identity with "that house" which votes to override a veto.
110. Recording the return in the journal may require a legislative act, but
the Constitution does not declare when that act must occur, and thus it could
be accomplished after adjournment or upon reassembly without violating any
constitutional requirement. A proceeding to reconsider a bill does not require
a legislative act, and similarly the Constitution sets no requirement on when
this must commence. See infra note 131.

1172

2MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1149

confined its conclusion to the necessary composition of a house
"for the purpose[s] of estimating [the] two-thirds vote required"
for overriding a veto.'1 1 Thus, the primary authority relied
upon by the Pocket Veto Case hardly supports its reasoning, nor
does the secondary authority in the case add measurable
12
support."
Overruling the Pocket Veto Case will also resolve the inconsistency and confusion inherent in the current line of
pocket veto precedents. Although factually and legally distinct,
Wright and the Pocket Veto Case strike an uneasy balance." 3
The Wright court expressly refused to consider the effect of a
single-house adjournment for more than three days." 4 Extending the Wright holding to include this circumstance creates
an anomaly: if one house adjourns for a month, the President
can constructively return a bill, but if both houses adjourn for
five days, the President cannot. Adding to the confusion are
two appellate court opinions, Kennedy and Barnes, both in conflict with the holding in the Pocket Veto Case, but suggesting
compelling reasons for their respective results.
Such confusion and inconsistency have no place in the legislative process, where certainty is of "paramount imporu 5
tance.""
Congress, the President, and the public must know,
as clearly as possible, the status of a bill at the end of the deliberation period. Evidence suggests that modern presidents are
unsure when the pocket veto clause is triggered and when it is
111. Missouri Pacific, 248 U.S. at 280.
112. The Pocket Veto Case also relied on the opinion of a constitutional historian to reach its house-in-session rule, see Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 683,
but this does not measurably add to the Court's argument. Neither does the
Court's citation of the opinion of an Attorney General provide substantive authority. Id. at 685. As a representative of the executive branch, the Attorney
General lacks credibility to objectively consider the scope of the pocket veto
power.
113. For example, as Justice Stone pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Wrigh4 "no plausible reason can be advanced for saying that [an officer of the
originating House] possesses authority to receive returned bills during a threeday [recess] which he does not possess during a four day or longer adjournment." Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 602 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring). The agent would have authority on one day under Wigh and lose it
the following day under the Pocket Veto Case. Indeed, it is illogical to say a
four-day adjournment prevents a return but a three-day adjournment does
not. See 116 CONG. REC. 44,482 (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in
House Pocket Veto Hearings, supra note 78, at 5; Comment, 12 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 90, 91 (1938).
114. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 590 (1938).
115. Id at 604 (Stone, J., concurring).
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not." 6 Overruling the Pocket Veto Case and permitting constructive return during all but final adjournments"17 will help
resolve the present confusion by removing the logical inconsistencies between Wright and the Pocket Veto Case, by resolving
the questions left open in Wright, and by validating the result
in Barnes and Kennedy.
Not only is the broad construction of the pocket veto power
in the Pocket Veto Case opinion unfounded, but it also ignores
the limited purpose of the pocket veto and leads to undesirable
consequences. The language of the pocket veto clause is inherently ambiguous and should be interpreted in light of its purpose, which can be determined by looking at article I, section 7
as a whole." 8 Fundamentally, the pocket veto power involves
116. Presidents Ford and Carter did not exercise intersession pocket vetoes
and constructively returned bills during intersession adjournments in spite of
the ruling in the Pocket Veto Case. In contrast, President Nixon did exercise
the intersession pocket veto. President Reagan has constructively returned
bills during intersession adjournments and exercised pocket vetoes during intersession adjournments as in Barnes. See Joint Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellants and Senate Intervenor Appellant at 48-53, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582
(U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). Such inconsistent practice contradicts the
Supreme Court's rulings, gives presidents impermissible discretion to exercise
the pocket veto, and creates uncertainty as to the status of bills presented to
the President prior to intersession adjournments.
117. Not permitting constructive return after final adjournments would
permit the President effectively to kill by pocket veto any bill of which he disapproves if it is presented prior to final adjournment. This is consistent with
the idea that a pocket veto results only when an adjournment prevents a return. After final adjournment all business expires and the pocket-vetoed bills
would have the same fate as pending legislation. Congress technically does not
exist, so it could not reconsider a veto if it were returned. Thus, at this point,
a pocket veto would not obstruct Congress's right to override and there is no
rationale for requiring constructive return of a bill.
118. Purpose provides the best basis for construing the pocket veto clause
because other interpretative guides are inadequate in this situation. The
clause does not define "prevent" and the Constitution uses "adjournment" in a

variety of ways. See, e.g., U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (providing for end of

daily session); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (providing for three-day adjournment of a house without consent of the other house); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3
(power of president to adjourn Congress if houses cannot agree on time for adjournment). In the context of the pocket veto clause, "adjournment" could
mean anything from final adjournment prior to election of a new Congress, to
adjournment at the end of each day.
The legislative procedure set forth in art. I, § 7, cl. 2, has not proved detailed enough to answer many of the questions that arise thereunder. For example, the ambiguous language of art. I, § 7, cl. 2, has forced the Court to
determine whether the President can approve bills following an adjournment,

see Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 492-94 (1932); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 554-55 (1899), and whether a vote to
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allocation of power between the executive and legislative
override a veto requires two-thirds of a quorum or two-thirds of the entire
membership, see Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1919). The
Court specifically has called the pocket veto clause of "'doubtful meaning,'"
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 690 (quoting State v. South Norwalk, 77 Conn.
257, 264, 58 A. 759, 761 (1904)).
That doubt has lead to a long history of disagreement between the legislative and executive branches concerning the scope of the pocket veto power.
Opinions from the Attorneys General have, not surprisingly, argued for a
broad view of the pocket veto power. See 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 274-78 (1943)
(Attorney General Biddle and 1927 letter from Attorney General Sargent
noted therein); 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 503, 508 (1892) (Attorney General Miller and
letter by Attorney General Devens reprinted therein). For its part, Congress
has contemplated legislating limitations on the pocket veto power on several
occasions. See H.R. 7386, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6225, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), reprintedin House Pocket Veto Hearings,supra note 78, at 1-2; S.
366, 40th Cong., 2d Sess (1868) (for a discussion of this bill, see Pocket Veto
Case, 279 U.S. at 685-87, 686 n.11). There is some question whether Congress
has power to pass such legislation. See infra note 142.
Nor do the records of the Constitutional Convention clearly reveal the
Framers' intent for application of the pocket veto clause. The Court in the
Pocket Veto Case found that "no light is thrown on the meaning of the constitutional provision in the proceedings and debate of the Constitutional Convention." Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 675. The Wright Court made no mention
of the Framers' intent except to conclude that the Framers' deliberate choice
of words commanded the exclusion of single-house adjournments from the
scope of the pocket veto clause. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587-88
(1938). Neither have courts found historical records determinative in interpreting other parts of art. I, § 7, cl. 2. See, e.g., Edwards, 286 U.S. at 487 (stating that proceedings and debates shed no light upon interpretation of art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2); Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 631
(Ct. Cl. 1964) (stating that as to measuring time of presentation of bills to the
President, the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention are of little assistance in interpreting art. I, § 7, cl. 2), cert denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965).
With no direct reference in the proceedings or debates about the creation
of the pocket veto, whatever evidence exists is circumstantial. An early draft
of the Constitution included language which would have required the President to return a bill "on the First Day of the next Meeting of the Legislature."
2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 162
(1911). This language, written by James Wilson, was deleted in a subsequent
draft, id, at 167, probably by John Rutledge, id,at 163 n.17, and the provision
which creates the pocket veto in present form was ultimately adopted by the
Convention. The deliberate rejection of this provision could imply that the
Framers did not want Congress to automatically reconsider vetoed legislation
at the next meeting. The records, however, do not show if the whole Convention knew of the original idea. Moreover, the Convention may have had other
reasons for failing to adopt this language guaranteeing Congress's ability to
override a veto, such as a desire not to provide the President with an openended deliberation period. Perhaps by "next meeting" the Framers meant final adjournments and did not want to allow reconsideration in that event. For
a general discussion of this topic, see Kennedy, supra note 37, at 359-64.
Commentators have also argued that the inclusion of the annual assembly
clause, art. I, § 4, cl. 2, demonstrates that the Framers knew Congress would
adjourn between sessions, permitting the inference that intersession adjourn-
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branches in the legislative process. In light of the delicate balance of powers created by the Constitution, the interpretation
pocket veto that best preserves that balance should
of the 119
prevail.
The last two provisions of article I, section 7 safeguard
Congress's primary role of enacting legislation and the President's formidable qualified veto power. 2 0 The first provision
ments were to be included under the language of the pocket veto clause. See
Kennedy, supra note 37, at 361; Brief for Appellees at 34-35, Barnes v. Kline,
759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom Burke v. Barnes, 54
U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). At best, this evidence is indirect and should not control interpretation of the pocket veto clause.
With the inherent ambiguity of art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and the lack of firm evidence of Framers' intent, the purpose of the pocket veto should guide interpretation of the constitutional language. '"Like most of the Constitution, the
simple words of the controlling clause carry the interpreter part way but do
not automatically unlock all the doors. The ultimate solution must, as so
often, be sought through the principles behind the language." Eber Bros.
Wine & Liquor Corp., 337 F.2d at 627. See Wrigh4 302 U.S. at 596; see also
Edwards, 286 U.S. at 486, 493 ("Regard must be had to the fundamental purpose of the constitutional provision to provide appropriate opportunity for the
President to consider the bills presented to him."); La Abra Silver Mining Co.,
175 U.S. at 453-55 (analyzing the underlying functions of the legislative and executive branches and concluding that the President may properly approve a
bill if such approval occurs while Congress is in recess for a named time).
119. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Kennedy, the court stated:
The subject matter at stake in this litigation is legislative power. The
court is presented with conflicting views of the pocket veto power,
one which is expansive, and another which is restrictive. Over the
long term, appellants' broad view of the pocket veto power threatens
a diminution of congressional influence in the legislative process.

Id.
120. The Framers could have vested the President with an even more formidable power-an absolute veto. The Convention considered and rejected
Alexander Hamilton's proposal for an absolute veto and instead vested the
President with a qualified veto. The Framers' objection to an absolute veto
arose, in part, from King George I's use of the device in vetoing colonial legislation, leading to the first grievance of the colonies listed in the Declaration
of Independence: "He has refused his Assent to laws, the most wholesome and
necessary for the public good." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776). For a discussion of the action in the Convention concerning the veto,
see Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
Hamilton ultimately came to defend the veto against opponents of the
Constitution who feared the similarity between the President and the English
King. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton argued the purpose of a limited
presidential veto:
It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of
any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body. The primary inducement to confer-
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gives the President ten days to consider, to approve, or to veto
and return a bill before it automatically becomes law,l 1 thus
keeping the President from holding the bill indefinitely and
thwarting Congress's right to override disapproved bills. The
second provision, the pocket veto clause, prevents Congress
from thwarting the President's right to veto and to return bills
by adjourning after presenting a bill.12 2 Without the pocket
veto clause, the bill would become law after ten days despite
the President's disapproval, unless the President cut short the
constitutionally mandated deliberation period to ensure return
of the vetoed bill prior to adjournment. Both courts 12s and
commentators2 4 universally agree that the narrow purpose of
the pocket veto is to protect the President's ten-day deliberation period and qualified veto power from congressional inring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to
defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor
of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities
by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the
one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might
speedily come to be blended in the same hands.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton). See also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (stating that the President's participation in the legislative process was meant by the Framers to protect the
executive branch from Congress). The Constitutional Convention grappled
with the problem of providing for an executive strong enough to withstand the
powers of Congress, but not so strong as to threaten the creation of an elective
monarchy. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDEN. OFFIcE AND PoWERS 1787-1984, at
10-16 (5th rev. ed. 1984); Zinn, 2he Veto Power of the Presiden4 12 F.R.D. 207,
212 (1951).
Commentators agree that, although not as powerful as an absolute veto,
the qualified veto constitutes one of the President's most potent prerogatives.
See E. CORWIN, supra, at 322; Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAw &
CONTEmp. PROBS. 87, 88-89 (1976); Zinn, supra, at 212-13. The small percentage of vetoed bills that Congress has overridden demonstrates the power of
the qualified veto. See E. CORWIN, supra, at 322 (estimating 17%); Zinn, supra,
at 215-16 (estimating 6%). For a discussion of the difficulties in overriding vetoes, see Black, supra, at 92-96. The mere threat of a veto provides the President with an important negotiating tool.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. For the text of clause 2, see supra
note 7.
122. Id
123. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 483 (1932); Barnes v. Kline, 759
F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom Burke v. Barnes, 54
U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d
430, 437-38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
124. Black, supra note 120, at 89; Miller, CongressionalPower to Define the
PresidentialPocket Veto Power, 25 VAND. L. REv. 557, 558-561 (1972); Comment, The Veto Power and Kennedy v. Sampson: Burning a Hole in the President's Pocket, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 587, 611 (1975).
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fringement. Thus, the pocket veto power is not intended to be
an affirmative grant of power.
Because it gives the President an absolute veto and deprives Congress of its right to override, the pocket veto should
be invoked only if Congress attempts to subvert the legislative
process. Any other interpretation contravenes the fundamental
purpose of the veto provisions and transforms the pocket veto
into a significant encroachment on the power of Congress.25
In fact, presidents have used the pocket veto strategically as an
affirmative grant of power and not as a defensive shield to pro26
tect their qualified veto from congressional infringement.
125. The unnecessary use of the pocket veto, enabled by a broad interpretation of the pocket veto clause, may be viewed as part of a general trend in
the 20th century to magnify presidential power at the expense of congressional
power in issues such as executive privilege, conduct of foreign affairs, and the
impoundment of funds. See Note, supra note 78, at 385-86.
126. In recent times, presidents commonly issue memoranda setting forth
substantive reasons for pocket vetoes. See J. KERNOCHAN, supra note 9, at 51;
Zinn, supra note 120, at 237-38. These messages thoroughly discredit the theory in the Pocket Veto Case that pocket-vetoed bills fail due to congressional
efforts to narrow the President's deliberation period. (It is also significant that
the executive branch has never alleged congressional interference with the deliberation period in any cases challenging a pocket veto.) If a President has
sufficient time to evaluate legislation and to formulate a position on its merits,
the President most likely has adequate time to return the bill to Congress for
a possible override vote.
The Court in the Pocket Veto Case did not believe the President should
use the pocket veto as a weapon but reasoned that the President would return
a bill if he could:
And it is plain that when the adjournment of Congress prevents the
return of a bill within the allotted time, the failure of the bill to become a law cannot properly be ascribed to the disapproval of the President-who presumably would have returned it before adjournment if
there had been sufficient time in which to complete his consideration
and take such action ....
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 678-79. This rather naive view ignores the fact
that the President has a natural incentive to use the pocket veto. Why return
a bill for possible override when, by use of the pocket veto, the President can
permanently kill it? See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 602 (1938)
(Stone, J., concurring).
The bill pocket-vetoed by President Nixon in Kennedy v. Sampson, 432
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) offers an excellent example of the abuse of the
pocket veto as a legislative weapon to avoid political defeat. The "Family
Practice of Medicine Act," S. 3418, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), passed the Senate by a vote of 64-1 and passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 3462. Kennedy, 432 F.2d at 432 n.3. Clearly, Congress could have overridden a
veto by President Nixon, who instead sent a memorandum containing his substantive objections: "[T]his bill is unnecessary and represents the wrong approach to the solution of the nation's health problems .

. . ."

President's

Memorandum of Disapproval Dated December 24, 1970, reprinted in House
Pocket Veto Hearings, supra note 78, at 4. President Nixon did not complain
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Additionally, abuse of the pocket veto power fosters unproductive conflict between the President and Congress21 and acts
undemocratically to cut off the dialogue and the controversy ordinarily following a veto and its reconsideration by Congress.1s
In sum, a narrow interpretation of the pocket veto clause
matches its narrow purpose and thus maintains the proper balance of powers in the legislative process by ensuring Congress's
authority to override bills disapproved by the President. 29
Allowing constructive return of bills during all but final
adjournments effectively fulfills the narrow purpose of the
pocket veto by guaranteeing both the President's constitutional
right to a ten-day deliberation period1 30 and Congress's essenabout inadequate time to consider the bill. See id. The term "Memorandum of
Disapproval" itself implies that the reasons for not signing the bill arose from
a policy dispute and not from lack of time for deliberation. Obviously, the
President merely used the congressional adjournment to employ a pocket veto
and to bar any attempt to override the bill.
Similarly, the statement issued by the executive branch following President Reagan's pocket veto of H.R. 4042 announced that, "[The President's] decision to oppose this certification legislation reflects the administration policy
that [the human rights certification] requirements distort our efforts to improve human rights, democracy, and recovery in El Salvador." 19 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 1627 (Nov. 30, 1983). No mention is made of inadequate
time for consideration. See id The statement demonstrates that the pocket
veto resulted from the President's opposition to the policy of H.R. 4042 and not
from congressional interference with the deliberation period.
127. See Miller, supra note 124, at 569; see also Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor
Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 629 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (stating that legislative
process envisioned in the Constitution is evidently meant to cut down unnecessary conflict between the branches by avoiding attempts by one branch to diminish the powers of the other branch), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965). The
public is best served if the Congress and the President save their energy and
resources for more constructive and productive disputes.
128. See Miller, supra note 124, at 558-61.
129. Congress's critical constitutional right to override vetoes is far too important to be subordinated to a technical requirement that Congress must be
physically in session to receive bills or that Congress must be able to reconsider vetoed bills immediately. Neither requirement is expressly demanded by
the Constitution; both arise only from the Pocket Veto Case. See Note, supra
note 14, at 170.
130. The need for the full deliberation period is particularly essential
under modern conditions because legislation is more complex, because it involves greater expenditure of resources, and because the sheer volume of bills
has increased substantially. Moreover, these conditions make passage of bills
more difficult, thus aggravating the flurry of bills presented just prior to adjournment. Thus, to carry out the purpose of the veto and to guard against
hasty, ill-considered legislation, contemporary presidents have an even
stronger need for the full ten-day deliberation period.
Courts have been sensitive to guarding the deliberation period other than
in relation to the pocket veto issue. See Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v.
United States, 337 F.2d 624, 629-30 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (holding that the ten-day de-
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tial constitutional right to override a veto. Indeed, as the
Barnes court noted, it is absurd to conclude that Congress prevents the return of a bill when Congress affirmatively sets up
procedures to facilitate its return.131 The Supreme Court has
already determined that the Constitution does not deny the use
liberation period does not commence until the President has returned from
travel out of the country unless Congress delivers the bill to the President
wherever he is located), cert, denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965); United States v. Taylor, 116 F. Supp. 439, 442-43 (D. Minn. 1953) (holding that day of presentment
is not included in ten days for deliberation), appeal dismissed, 214 F.2d 351
(8th Cir. 1954).
Several factors counterbalance this problem. For example, the President
has the entire time Congress considers a bill to analyze it; thus, he actually has
more than just the ten days to take a position on the bill. Moreover, executive
agencies usually participate in the legislative process by providing expert testimony and are ready to recommend a position to the President. The President
also has a comprehensive and coordinated system of evaluating legislation
upon presentment which commonly results in a memorandum from the rele-

vant executive staff summarizing the issues. See J. KERNOCHAN, supra note 9,
at 51-52.
131. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom.
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781). See Black,
supra note 120, at 87, 101.
The executive branch has argued that Congress can maintain the delicate
balance of power in the legislative process merely by avoiding any opportunity
for a pocket veto. Congress could theoretically present bills at the end of the
session and then wait ten days before adjourning, or it could wait and present
the bills at the beginning of the next session. See Brief for the Appellees at
47-49, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
Although technically true, this argument is unrealistic and, perhaps, contrary to the constitutional purpose for the pocket veto. To the extent the
pocket veto is intended to avoid delay, see supra note 95 and accompanying
text, waiting until the following session to present bills increases delay in determining the outcome of legislation. Moreover, because Congress does not
know which bills the President might pocket veto, it would have to withhold
all bills passed at the end of a session. This would frustrate national policy
and make those individuals and entities affected by the imminent legislation
unsure as how to conduct their affairs in the interim.
For Congress to remain in session after submitting all bills passed at the
end of the session until the pocket veto "window" closes is wasteful, inefficient, and ignores the necessary pattern of the legislative process. Admittedly,
Congress may be guilty of procrastination that results in the passage of much
legislation just prior to adjournments. Still, the end-of-session rush also results from the necessity of committee work occupying the early part of a session and final adoption occurring later in the session. Adjournments actually
perform the important function of a deadline. Also, proponents and opponents
of legislation could try to manipulate the calendar for political advantage. It is
naive to believe that the end-of-session rush will change, and the limited purpose of the pocket veto does not warrant such a change. The workings of Congress and its power to override are too important to be subverted by the
pocket veto. "The problems of government are practical. Common sense has a
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of appropriate agencies to effect a return1 32 and has validated
the President's use of an agent to receive bills submitted by
Congress; 133 no compelling reason exists to preclude Congress
from using an agent to receive a veto.'3 Employing a pragmatic procedure to harmonize presidential and congressional
authority does not offend the Constitution. 135 The Wright
right to sit in judgment upon this question." Brief of Amicus Curiae at 34,
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
It is no better to say that Congress can maintain its power in the legislative process by reenacting pocket-vetoed legislation. This approach is wasteful
of precious legislative energy and resources. Furthermore, the coalition of
forces which enabled passage of a bill may well have disappeared by the time
the bill is resubmitted. The legislative process is complex and arduous, and
the chances of a bill passing both houses of Congress twice are tenuous. The
purposes of the pocket veto do not justify this unnecessary impediment to congressional action. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 n.17 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
132. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 589 (1938).
133. See Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624,
629-30 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965).
134. To say that the Congress cannot use constructive return is inconsistent with procedures permitted to effect other requirements of the legislative
process. For example, the Constitution requires that if the President disapproves a bill "he shall return it" to the originating house, and that the
originating house "shall enter" the return and the President's objections on its
journal. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. No one expects the President to personally carry bills from the White House to the Capitol; no one expects a member
of Congress to physically write objections to a bill in the Congressional Record. As the amicus in Pocket Veto Case argued, constructive return is recognized when Congress uses an agency to present a bill to the President, when
the President uses an agency to receive the bill, and when the President uses
an agency to return the bill to Congress. No logical policy or common-sense
reason exists to bar the use of agents in the final step which culminates the
exchange of bills. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 37-39, Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. 655 (1929).
135. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice
John Marshall stated:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind ....
.
The Government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means, and those who contend
that it may not select any appropriate means; that one particular
mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the
burden of establishing that exception.

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
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Court firmly established that constructive return is pragmatic,136 and delay and uncertainty are not markedly greater
during modem intersession adjournments than during the re137
cess in Wright.
Thus, the weakly supported, internally inconsistent, and
constitutionally unnecessary interpretation in the Pocket Veto
Case gives a broad scope to the pocket veto power, skewing the
delicate balance in the legislative process, transforming the narrow defensive purpose of the pocket veto into a considerable
presidential weapon, and causing confusion among Congress,
the President, and the courts. Although the holding in the
Pocket Veto Case is still good law, it is neither desirable constitutional interpretation nor good policy. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should reconsider and overrule the Pocket Veto
8

Case.13

Id at 407, 409, 421. But see Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("[Ihe fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating function of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution."). Although the Chadha
Court stated that mere utilitarianism will not justify an unconstitutional procedure, id at 942, the permissibility of constructive return is not an issue of
whether practical considerations should override the Constitution. The issue
is constitutionality, not pragmatism. The language of the pocket veto clause is
ambiguous, see supra note 118, and does not preclude constructive return. The
issue must be resolved by construing the constitutional language and, in this
circumstance, the Court can consider policy in order to implement the intent
of the document as a whole. The Constitution envisions protection of both the
President's deliberation period and Congress's right to override. See supra
notes 120-124 and accompanying text. Constructive return accomplishes both
objectives. Overruling the Pocket Veto Case would integrate both the pragmatic and the constitutional benefits of constructive return.
136. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 591, 595 (1938); supra note
98 and accompanying text.
137. See supranotes 95-98 and accompanying text.
138. This suggestion to overrule the Pocket Veto Case is made with due respect for the Court's understandable reluctance to overrule past decisions. In
Morague v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Court enunciated several factors for consideration in overruling precedent. These factors
include furnishing a clear guide for conduct, furthering fair litigation by eliminating the need to repeatedly litigate identical issues, and maintaining public
faith in the judicial system. Id at 403. The present state of the pocket veto
issue meets this heavy burden. The confusing state of the law encourages
challenges to pocket vetoes and does not provide an adequately clear guide for
the President, Congress, and the public as to how an essential part of the legislative process is conducted. Uncertainty as to when a pocket veto opportunity
is created fosters uncertainty about the status of bills submitted to the President just prior to intersession adjournments, but not signed within the deliberation period. Moreover, the narrow and overly technical house-in-session
standard enunciated in the Pocket Veto Case subverts the legislative process
and violates the spirit of the Constitution by depriving Congress of its ability
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Once freed from the limitation of the Pocket Veto Case, the
Supreme Court should announce a clear new standard. In doing so, the Court should weigh the critical need for the certainty provided by a standard based on a specific type of
adjournment against the arbitrariness that a broader pocket
veto power necessarily entails. The Barnes opinion suggests a
flexible case-by-case approach, not based upon the type of adjournment, but upon whether the adjournment actually prevents return as a practical and factual matter. 3 9 This approach
permits constructive return if Congress does nothing to narrow
the President's deliberation period by obstructing constructive
return, and if it continues contemporary practices such as carrying over legislative business between sessions, taking relatively short adjournments, and expressly authorizing agents to
receive vetoed bills during adjournments. 140
to override disapproved bills. In return, this standard achieves little of positive
consequence. Thus, the gravity of the issue also supports overruling the precedent.
The Court should overrule the Pocket Veto Case prospectively. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court suggested that a prospective overruling must establish a new principle of law and must avoid
substantial inequitable results that retroactive application would cause. See id.
at 106-07. Permitting constructive return and not requiring return of bills to a
house in session would constitute a new principle of law. Technically, a retroactive decision would invalidate all prior pocket vetoes, and those bills would
have the status of law. This would be an unacceptable result. Thus, the Court
has adequate justification to overrule the Pocket Veto Case prospectively.
139. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.grantedsub
nom Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781).
140. Under this standard, one could agree that historically intersession adjournments may have prevented the return of bills because Congress, until
more recent times, completed its business and adjourned for long periods between sessions. Members dispersed, and primitive transportation made reassembly unlikely until the next session. Congressional staff, if any, did not
function between sessions. More important, Congress, at that time following
the practice of the British Parliament, did not carry over legislation from the
first session to the second. See Kennedy, supra note 118, at 379. This is no
longer the case. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 36 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
grantedsub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 54 T.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No.
85-781). The 20th amendment, in combination with a vastly increased workload, has changed adjournment practices. See id. at 36 n.26. Congress now
takes more short adjournments during the session and more brief adjournments between sessions. See supra note 97. For a general discussion of the
evolution in congressional adjournment practices see Kennedy, supra note 37,
at 378-380; Comment, supra note 124, at 608-11.
Thus, if the central issue is what congressional actions prevent return of a
bill, construction of the pocket veto clause should properly take changed environment into account, and the Supreme Court should reevaluate the vitality of
the Pocket Veto Case. Moreover, a reevaluation would not slight the Constitution for reasons of efficiency and pragmatism. See supra note 135. If the
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Critics might claim that the Barnes opinion creates uncertainty by not providing clear standards which enable all concerned parties to readily determine the status of a bill at the
end of the deliberation period. Indeed, because it furnishes numerous grounds for challenging the validity of bills, the flexibility of the Barnes court's approach could invite strategic
litigation by the President, by Congress, or by members of the
public affected by the legislation.
A more precise standard based upon the type of adjournment, however, suffers from serious drawbacks as well. It
ignores the fact that the Constitution itself sets a flexible standard, allowing pocket vetoes only when an adjournment prevents a return. Conditioning pocket vetoes on the type of
adjournment would read this flexibility out of the Constitution.
Delineating the pocket veto power by type of adjournment also
ignores the fact that adjournment practices evolve over time.
For example, a bright-line distinction between intersession and
intrasession adjournments could result in an anomaly whereby
intrasession adjournments that do not trigger a pocket veto
could be longer than intersession adjournments that trigger the
clause. Further, the need for certainty should not diminish
Congress's essential power to reconsider and to override disapproved legislation, nor can certainty justify an illogical, arbitrary rule.
The Court should adopt the fact-based "prevent" standard
suggested by the court in Barnes. 141 The Court could ameliorate the certainty problem and discourage nuisance suits by
clearly and forcefully stating the criteria courts should consider
when determining whether an adjournment actually prevents a
return. Such criteria could include repeal of congressional
rules authorizing an agent to receive returned bills, repeal of
rules allowing legislative business to be carried over between
sessions, or attempts by Congress to obstruct a return or to deprive the President of a full deliberation period or veto power.
Congress could add clarity to the process by passing a statute
formalizing the procedures for constructive return and for car1
ryover of legislative business, as contemplated in the past. 4
Framers had intended to create an inflexible rule, they could have done so. To
the contrary, the Framers adopted a flexible rule governed by what prevents a
return. Refusing to acknowledge contemporary conditions would ignore that

flexibility.
141. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.grantedsub nom
Burke v. Barnes, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (No. 85-781)
142. See, e.g., S. 1642, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprintedin Miller, supra
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CONCLUSION
Although reaching the correct result, the Barnes decision is
not supported by the precedents cited as authority. The appellate court's misuse of precedent further aggravates the confusion surrounding the proper interpretation of the pocket veto
clause. The Supreme Court can fairly resolve the dilemma between correct result and faulty analysis of precedents only by
noting the invalidity of the Barnes decision under the Pocket
Veto Case ruling and then by validating the Barnes result by
overruling the Pocket Veto Case. That accomplished, the Court
1 43
should set narrow boundaries for the pocket veto power,
adopting a test based on whether Congress actually prevented a
return. Such a test would restrict the pocket veto to its proper
role in the legislative process, by striking an appropriate balance between the President's power to veto bills and Congress's
power to override such vetoes.
Benson K. Whitney

note 124, at 571 app.; H.R. 6225, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprintedin House
Pocket Veto Hearings, supra note 78, at 1-2. These bills attempt to formalize
the exchange of bills between the President and Congress, and they allow for
constructive presentation, constructive return, carryover of legislative business
between sessions, and announcement of the constructive return by an agent on
the first succeeding day in session. Such measures need not constitute an attempt by Congress to construe the pocket veto clause as some commentators
have suggested Congress has the power to do. See Miller, supra note 124, at
566-69; Zinn, supra note 120, at 218-20. Others have disagreed that Congress
has such authority in interpreting the Constitution. See House Pocket Veto
Hearings, supra note 78, at 22-24 (testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen. William H.
Rehnquist). Rather than construing the Constitution, Congress would add certainty to the fact-based standard suggested in Barnes by adding measurable
criteria by which a court could evaluate whether Congress actually prevented
a return. Any attempt to alter the rules governing the exchange procedure
would evidence an attempt by Congress to obstruct the President's ability to
return bills during adjournments.
143. Narrowing the scope of the federal pocket veto would match the restrictive view that states have taken to state pocket veto provisions. A majority of states have codified restrictions to the pocket veto by constitutional
amendment, and others have completely disposed of the pocket veto. For a
survey of state pocket veto provisions, see Comment, supra note 124, at 613-24.

